Priprave na Osimska pogajanjaViljenka Škorjanec
, 2006, original scientific article
Abstract: An analysis of archival material has shown the significance of the preparations for the negotiations that terminated in the acceptance of the Italian mandate and enabled the beginning of the negotiations for the subsequent Treaty of Osimo. Following the 1954 Memorandum of Understanding, the Italian side used the legal aspect of the agreement as a pretext for stalling over the final resolution of the border delineation issue, claiming that the situation with Zone B of the Free Territory of Trieste was only temporary. Italy also asked for some minor corrections near the border already defined by the Paris Peace Treaty. In 1968, the events in Czechoslovakia and the advanced age of President Tito persuaded the Italian government to start tackling the open issues with Yugoslavia. In that year, the Italian foreign minister, Medici, proposed a package of eighteen items, which included the suggestion that the demarcation line defined by the Memorandum of Understanding become a state border with territorial provisions and which was accepted as a negotiation platform for further dialogue at the meeting of ministers Medici and Miniæ held in Dubrovnik in March of 1973. Hereit is possible to observe a quality shift in the interstate relations and the negotiation process leading to the Treaty of Osimo. After several years of stalling, the Italian side had agreed that two mandataries be nominated in Dubrovnik in place of the previous experts, whose task would be the preparation of the draft of the final agreement. At the same time, Italy was given concrete deadlines for the fulfilment of its obligations. Alongside the official diplomatic channel the two ministers privately agreed on a special, parallel channel for secret negotiations of political mandataries as an alternative that would allow the negotiations to be continued should the likewise secret diplomatic negotiations fail to progress. The political leadership of Italy, especially the Christian Democracy party wanted to use this other channel to establish a direct dialogue parallel to the state relations directed by official diplomacy. The Italian suggestion for negotiations outside the institutional frameworks, when the states precluded from negotiations the respective foreign ministries, eventually proved the only real possibility for arriving at an agreement. The diplomatic negotiations ended towards the end of 1973 without any success. At that time the other channel was not quite active yet, all respective developments having come to a yearlong standstill soon after the establishment of the latter. After several poignant diplomatic notes and President Tito's Sarajevo speech, Andreotti, in his speech held in Udine in May, 1974, announced Italy's intention to reach an appropriate agreement with Yugoslavia. In view of the forthcoming Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to be heldin Helsinki and the fundamental principle concerning the finality of stateborders, the leadership of Christian Democracy estimated that an unsolvedborder issue was compromising global Italian politics. Following a correction to the Italian mandate and the arrival of the Italian delegation at Strmol in July, 1974, the Yugoslav side accepted the Italian proposal of negotiations between special political mandataries. This ended the preparations for the negotiations that successfully concluded with the signing of a Treaty in Osimo.
Found in: ključnih besedah
Summary of found: ... mednarodna politika, diplomacija, Jugoslavija, Italija, pogajanja, ...
Keywords: mednarodna politika, diplomacija, Jugoslavija, Italija, pogajanja
Published: 10.07.2015; Views: 924; Downloads: 7
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