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Collective memory and social identity : a social psychological exploration of the memories of the disintegration of former Yugoslavia
Marja Kuzmanić, 2008, original scientific article

Abstract: Through narration of memories of events related to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, this study takes a social psychological approach and explores the generational and ethnic group differences in collective memories, social representations and social identities of peoples living in Slovenia. It represents an initial step at mapping out the differing collective memories, representations and identities of Slovenians and other former Yugoslav peoples now resident in Slovenia in relation to some of the major recent historical and political events (Tito's death, the wars in Slovenia, Bosnia and Croatia, the beginning of the war(s), and the attainment of independence of Slovenia). Eighteen semi-structured interviews with members of three ethnic communities (Bosniac and Serb minority and Slovenian majority) were conducted and are qualitatively analysed. The findings are discussed in two sections. The first illustrates the contested interpretations of the break up of the federation, whereas the second section discusses the complex changes inidentification that occurred during the transition in the Slovenian context. Above all, the material reveals that contested narratives of the breakup of Yugoslavia (the narratives of 'transition', 'disintegration' and 'war') are present.
Keywords: kolektivni spomin, socialna identiteta, socialne predstave, narativ, razpad nekdanje Jugoslavije, collective memory, social identity, social representations, narratives, disintegration of former Yugoslavia
Published in RUP: 10.07.2015; Views: 2797; Downloads: 39
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5.
Titovi pogovori v moskvi aprila 1968 in češkoslovaška kriza
Jan Pelikán, 2010, original scientific article

Abstract: In April 1968, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia took certain steps indicating the rapprochement of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Belgrade welcomed Prague's interest in establishing closer contact. However, politicians in Belgrade refused to accept proposals which the Kremlin could perceive as an interference into its sphere of influence. The leadership of the SFRY, for example, did not respond to the offer for a conclusion to the Czechoslovak-Yugoslavian treaty of alliance. At the end of April 1968 J. Broz Tito paid an uplanned visit to Moscow. His talks with Kremlin politicians proceeded for a long time in a friendly atmosphere. Disagreement arose only during the course of a discussion about development in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet leaders unambiguously declared that the then leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was unable to maintain control of the situation and the power in country was to be taken over by counter-revolutionary forces. Brezhnev even warned against the danger of executing communists in Czechoslovakia and insisted on halting the unfavourable development. Josip Broz Tito overskipped Brezhnev's not very hidden references to the necessity of the power intervention in Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, he irritably replied to the comment that development in Czechoslovakia could negatively influence not only the inner situation in the neighbouring socialist countries but also in Yugoslavia. Remarkably, during talks in Moscow, Tito never - even indirectly - made a mention of the positive trends of the development in Czechoslovakia. Yet he always suggested that the new Prague leadership was able to manage with those negative tendencies. Josip Broz Tito conspicuously endeavoured to maintain the existing standard of relations with the USSR and to not unnecessarily irritate the Kremlin. He was particularly afraid of the deterioration of the bilateral economic relations which could have had a negative impact on the Yugoslavian economy. Judging by the following steps we can anticipate, that positive moments predominated in Tito feelings regarding negotiations with the Kremlin leaders. He came back home convinced that although the Kremlin still viewed the SFRY as the potential troublesome element on the borderline of their sphere of interest, they were, on the other hand, essentially in need of Yugoslavian help in the solution of problems not only within the frame of the Communist movement but also within the Eastern block
Keywords: Prague Spring, international politics, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Tito, Soviet Union
Published in RUP: 10.07.2015; Views: 2403; Downloads: 18
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