20.500.12556/RUP-5030 Cenzurni krivdorek kot mesto zloma pozitivističnega pravnega diskurza Judicial censorship as a place for the breakdown of positivist jurisprudential discourse V članku se posvečamo eni od oblik cenzure, sodni prepovedi objave. Tak akt spravi diskurz najbolj razširjene šole pravnega pozitivizma v skrajno situacijo. Pozitivizem je ujetnik iluzije, da je lahko neki pomen besedila "tukaj": pravo naj bi lahko malodane prijeli v roko, v obliki zakonika, sestavljenega iz jasno strukturiranega besedila, členjenega v paragrafe, ki jih lahko vsakdo prebere in razume. Pri sprejemanju sodne odločitve o cenzuri literarnega dela se tak diskurz zlomi. Literarno delo ne vsebuje le nejasnih pojmov, pač pa mu manjka tudi čvrsta artikulacija pomenskosti, tj. tetičnost. Umetniško besedilo ničesar ne trdi. Toda na drugi strani mora sodišče v določenih primerih avtorja vendarle obtožiti, da trdi nekaj prepovedanega: da žali, da podtika, da poziva itn. Kako premostiti ta prepad med pozitivističnim osredotočanjem na "tukaj" pomena na eni strani in med neprimernostjo takega pristopa za resnico literature na drugi? Pokazali bomo, da takega razkola nikoli ni bilo in da obe vrsti interpretacije, pravna in literarna, temeljita na isti odprtosti interpreta do pomena kot takega. This paper discusses one form of censorship: judicial inhibition of publishing. This kind of act places discourse on judicial positivism, the widest positivist school of jurisprudence, in a borderline situation. Positivism is a captive of the illusion of the "here and now" of meaning. The law can almost be held in hand. It is the statute book lying on the table, with its text clearly structured in paragraphs so that anyone can read and understand it effortlessly. Upon obtaining a judicial decision for censorship,this discourse breaks down. It is not only that "vague notions" in literary interpretation are created, but also that a firm articulation of meaning - that is, theticism - disappears. Artistic texts do not "assert" anything. On the other hand, in its verdict the court still has to accuse the author of stating something that is forbidden: "insulted", "instigated", "slandered", "called", and so on. How is it possible to bridge this gap between the positivist concentration on the "here and now" of meaning, and the obvious unsuitability of this approach for truth in literature? This paper shows that this gap has never existed and that the interpretation of both judicial and literary texts is based on the same openness of the interpreter to the meaning as such. literatura cenzura pravo pravna interpretacija filozofija prava literature and censorship law juridical interpretation philosophy of law true false false Slovensko društvo za primerjalno književnost Slovenski jezik Angleški jezik Delo ni kategorizirano 2015-07-10 18:10:24 2015-07-10 18:10:24 2024-03-01 12:20:46 0000-00-00 00:00:00 2008 0 0 Str. 33-40 + 191-199 31 0000-00-00 NiDoloceno NiDoloceno NiDoloceno 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 0351-1189 351.751.5:82.0 37376354 1504211 http://www.dlib.si/details/URN:NBN:SI:DOC-7HTAOILK 1 https://repozitorij.upr.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=5030 Univerza na Primorskem 0 0 0