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"Skrivanje sijaja" : vzpon in zaton konfucijanske zunanje politike
Helena Motoh, 2016, original scientific article

Keywords: mehka moč, kulturna diplomacija, kitajska kultura, taoguang yanghui
Published in RUP: 08.08.2016; Views: 2558; Downloads: 119
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Priprave na Osimska pogajanja
Viljenka Škorjanec, 2006, original scientific article

Abstract: An analysis of archival material has shown the significance of the preparations for the negotiations that terminated in the acceptance of the Italian mandate and enabled the beginning of the negotiations for the subsequent Treaty of Osimo. Following the 1954 Memorandum of Understanding, the Italian side used the legal aspect of the agreement as a pretext for stalling over the final resolution of the border delineation issue, claiming that the situation with Zone B of the Free Territory of Trieste was only temporary. Italy also asked for some minor corrections near the border already defined by the Paris Peace Treaty. In 1968, the events in Czechoslovakia and the advanced age of President Tito persuaded the Italian government to start tackling the open issues with Yugoslavia. In that year, the Italian foreign minister, Medici, proposed a package of eighteen items, which included the suggestion that the demarcation line defined by the Memorandum of Understanding become a state border with territorial provisions and which was accepted as a negotiation platform for further dialogue at the meeting of ministers Medici and Miniæ held in Dubrovnik in March of 1973. Hereit is possible to observe a quality shift in the interstate relations and the negotiation process leading to the Treaty of Osimo. After several years of stalling, the Italian side had agreed that two mandataries be nominated in Dubrovnik in place of the previous experts, whose task would be the preparation of the draft of the final agreement. At the same time, Italy was given concrete deadlines for the fulfilment of its obligations. Alongside the official diplomatic channel the two ministers privately agreed on a special, parallel channel for secret negotiations of political mandataries as an alternative that would allow the negotiations to be continued should the likewise secret diplomatic negotiations fail to progress. The political leadership of Italy, especially the Christian Democracy party wanted to use this other channel to establish a direct dialogue parallel to the state relations directed by official diplomacy. The Italian suggestion for negotiations outside the institutional frameworks, when the states precluded from negotiations the respective foreign ministries, eventually proved the only real possibility for arriving at an agreement. The diplomatic negotiations ended towards the end of 1973 without any success. At that time the other channel was not quite active yet, all respective developments having come to a yearlong standstill soon after the establishment of the latter. After several poignant diplomatic notes and President Tito's Sarajevo speech, Andreotti, in his speech held in Udine in May, 1974, announced Italy's intention to reach an appropriate agreement with Yugoslavia. In view of the forthcoming Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to be heldin Helsinki and the fundamental principle concerning the finality of stateborders, the leadership of Christian Democracy estimated that an unsolvedborder issue was compromising global Italian politics. Following a correction to the Italian mandate and the arrival of the Italian delegation at Strmol in July, 1974, the Yugoslav side accepted the Italian proposal of negotiations between special political mandataries. This ended the preparations for the negotiations that successfully concluded with the signing of a Treaty in Osimo.
Keywords: mednarodna politika, diplomacija, Jugoslavija, Italija, pogajanja
Published in RUP: 10.07.2015; Views: 3141; Downloads: 32
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Skrivnostni tiskar Tolomeo Ianiculo : tiskana knjiga iz 16. stoletja kot zgodovinski vir?
Igor Presl, 2008, original scientific article

Abstract: The author of the article combined findings published in other articles, archival sources and bibliographical analysis of several printed books by the Italian humanist man of letters and diplomat Giangiorgio Trissino in order to dispel the doubts about the identity of Trissino's printer Bartolomeo Zanetti who used the pseudonym Tolomeo Ianiculo to hide his real name when working with Trissino. Bibliographical analysis of material (non-textual) elements of some Trissino's books available nowadays revealed that they were printed in a manner corresponding to Zanetti's printing style. When printing Trissino's works in 1529, Zanetti worked as a travelling and occasional printer without his own movable type, printing press and the possibility of regular supply of paper. All these circumstances were "imprinted" on his books, which allows us to "read" them historically. The author of the article was also interested in the reasons why Zanetti decided to reject the fame he could have shared with Trissino. At that time, printers were usually proud of their work as printing required the mastery of a more advanced technique than manuscript binding. In addition, printed items reached the masses, thus increasing printers' fame and giving them the possibility of transcending their mortality, which was an important goal of a Renaissance man. The reasons for using a pseudonym were much deeper than in the case of Palladio - the pseudonym that Trissino assigned to the promising contractor Andrea di Pietro. They sprang from an environment imbued with espionage and conspiracy, with both characterizing Trissino and Zanetti's lives and work during an intense period marked by war and political intrigues. Only when reading "between the lines", one can put together a feasible and meaningful mosaic out of seemingly unconnected and arbitrary fragments of empirical "facts". What the two protagonists had in common was the knowledge of Greek and acquaintanceship with Greek scholars and medical circles, interest in calligraphy and printing, as well as in all activities necessary for intelligence and other secret services. The real identity of Trissino's printer can be inferred with great certainty from the book on poisons and antidotes that features Trissino's signet and Zanetti's real name. Having been created in the information centre of anti-Venetian alliances during a huge scandal (I segretari del 1542) whose main agent - the French Ambassador Guillaume Pellicier - had financed its publication, the book also confirms the suspicion that they were both involved in the intelligence service. Therefore it can be concluded that by using Trissino's signet Zanetti wanted to protect himself as Venice had already forgiven the courteous man of letters and diplomat his pro-Habsburg sympathies
Keywords: analitična bibliografija, Benetke, vodni znaki, tiskarji, vohunstvo, diplomacija, 16.stol., pisarji
Published in RUP: 10.07.2015; Views: 6509; Downloads: 28
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